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RECENT CASE NOTES
EVIDENCE-INSURANCF--APPEAL AND ERRoR.-An action by Appellee
against Appellant upon a policy of life insurance. Averment that on June
3, 1903, Appellant issued to one Leonard a policy of insurance on his life
for $10,000. Answer alleging waiver of proof by denial of liability be-
cause of forfeiture, and setting up a general averment of performance.
First allegation was dismissed. Appellant contended that evidence ad-
mitted to show waiver was inadmissible after dismissal of first allegation.
Defendant appealed from judgment for Plaintiffs in circuit court of Posey
County. Held: evidence of waiver of conditions of insurance contracts
may be made under general denial; that employes of insurer are per-
mitted to testify as to premiums paid to clarify entries in books which
were offered as evidence, providing they did not act as agent in making
or continuing contract; that deposits showing entries in the books of the
home office of insurer as to premium are not admissible as part of res
gestae. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Camp-
bell et al., Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 19, 1925. 150 N. E. 31.
Where there is a general allegation of performance of the conditions
of an insurance contract, proof of waiver of conditions may be made.
Union Fraternal League v. Sweeney, 184 Ind. 378, 111 N. E. 305. Travelers'
Insurance Company v. Fletcher American National Bank, 148 N. E. 501.
But the evidence to prove a waiver of conditions must have probative force;
such evidence must not be merely corroborative of more definite evidence
because violent or unnatural inferences are not permitted. (Elliotts'
Evidence No. 6.) Evidence that has no probative power should be re-
jected and withdrawn from consideration. "Evidence may be legally ad-
missible as tending to prove a particular fact which yet for itself is utter-
ly insufficient for the purpose. It may be a link in the chain, but it cannot
make a chain unless other links are added." Howard Express Co. v. Wile,
64 Penn. 201; Schrock v. Solar Gas Light Co., 222 Pa. 271, 273, 71 A 94, 95.
If in the instant case Appellees should have produced definite evidence
supporting the corroborative evidence as to the payment by note and waiver
of receipt, the evidence of Appellees would not have been objectionable. Cir-
cumstances in this case sustain at most but a possibility of payment of
second premium and as such they will not sustain a legitimate inference
as a verdict of a jury cannot be upheld by mere conjecture or speculation.
Johnson v. Brady, 60 Ind. App. 556, 109 N. E. 230; Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v Vance, 58 Ind. App. 1, 108 N. E. 158.
Instruction when offered, striking out corroborative evidence, should be
given by the court.
Employes of an insurance company may be permitted to testify as to
whether there is a waiver of a condition in an insurance policy and a pay-
ment made of premium, providing they do not come under the statute.
(Section 523, Burns Rev. Stat. 1914.) But where as in the instant case
the data concerning the insurance is handled by clerks, evidence is ad-
missible. Entries made at the home of an insurance company disproving
a waiver of a condition of an insurance contract are not admissible in evi-
dence as part of the res gestae unless the entries were made at or near
the time of the transaction from reliable information derived from those in
charge of the business or work on which the action is based. State ex rel.
Romona Co. v. Central Stateg Bridge Company, 49 Ind. App. 544, 97 N. E.
803. Johnson v. Zimmerman, 42 Ind. App. 165, 84 N. E. 541. The rule is
laid down that entries must be original and not on the representations
made by another party. In Fleming v. Jost, 137 Ind. 195 it was held the
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entries must be made at the time the act was done. The entries must be
made by a person having knowledge of the facts entered, or at least knowl-
edge that the information was communicated to the entrant by some person
engaged in the business, whose duty it was to transact the particular busi-
ness, and make a report thereof for entry. Marks v. Box, 54 Ind. App.
487, 103 N. E. 27.
J. C. A.
EVIDENCE-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-WAR-MASTER AND SERVANT.-
Claim for compensation was filed under the Workmen's Compensation
Act by Ante Jelenovic, et aL., claimants for the death of Ivan Jelenovic.
Appellees filed this claim with the Industrial Board averring that they
are dependents of deceased who lost his life in September, 1917, as a result
of an accident which occurred in the course of his employment by the appel-
lant. The appellees were aliens living in that part of Austria-Hungary
which is now Jugo-Slovia. They became alien enemies when the United
States declared war on Austria in December, 1917. In 1918 the United
States recognized Jugo-Slovia as an independent government, but did not
formally ratify a treaty of peace with Austria and declare the war at an
end until December 1921. This action was brought in March, 1923. Ap-
pellants contend that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellees claim that the statute was suspended because of war. Held:
that recognition of Jugo-Slovia, with which the United States was at no
time at war is not regarded as terminating the war against other powers;
that the operation of the statute against alien enemies is suspended during
the period of the war. (Inland Steel Co. v. Jelenovic, 150 N. E. 391.)
The statute of limitations in this action is two years. (Acts 1915 p 398 c.
106; Burns 1926, Section 9439.) However, this is suspended during the
time that the appellees were alien enemies because they could not bring suit
in our courts. The court will take judicial cognizance of the historical events
which determine the duration of the appellees' alien enemy status. Recog-
nition of a government arising out of a rebellion against the enemy does
not necessarily change the status of the alien enemies domiciled in the terri-
tory then held by that government. (Garvin v. Diamond Coal and Coke Co.,
278 Pa. St. 469, 123 Atl. 468; contra, Kolundjija. v. Hannax Ore Mining Co.,
155 Minn. 176, 193 N. W. 163.) Recognition of a foreign government is a
political act and is conclusive in courts only in regard to those things it
actually decides and this act was not intended to terminate the war. (Ham-
ilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, 40 S. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. 194; Congressional
Record 1919 pp. 4434, 4435.) Therefore, since recognition did not change
the alien enemy status of the appellees, the statute of limitations did not
resume operation until the ratification of the treaty of peace and the claim
of the appellees is not barred by the statute.
Where the United States is waging war against another nation and a
faction in that enemy nation rebels and seizes some territory and is recog-
nized by the United States as a separate nation it does not necessarily
follow that the alien enemy status of the people domiciled in that terri-
tory is changed. This status does not rest entirely on domicile but is also
based on nationality which is not affected by a mere change in government.
Therefore the recognition of Jugo-Slovia did not alter the status of the
appellees and the statute of limitations remained in effect till 1921. (Dick-
inson, Recent Recognition Cases, 19 American Journal of International
Law 263; The unrecognized Government or state in English and Ameri-
can Law, 22 Mich. Law Rev. 1; Mathews, The Termination of War, 19
Mich. Law Rev. 816.)
W. V. H.
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NEGLIGENCE--FAILURE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO INJURED CHILD-AT-
TRACTIVE NuISANcE.-Appellee, a six year old boy, while playing on the
appellant's railroad was injured by appellant's train. It was alleged that
one of the employes in charge of the train knew that appellee was injured,
that this employe negligently failed to render aid to appellee or report
the accident for a period of forty minutes, and that this resulted in great
loss of blood and infection to appellee's wound. It was further alleged
that the company's right of way was an attractive nuisance. The cause
was tried by a jury and there was a verdict and judgment for $10,000.
Motion for new trial was overruled. Held: appellee was at most a li-
censee, the railroad right of way was not an attractive nuisance and there
was no duty of aid to the appellee imposed on appellent's servant in the
absence of an allegation that this servant knew that appellee was in need
of his aid in an emergency. It appeared from the case that notice of ap-
pellee's injury was given at once to medical authorities by another em-
ploye and that appellee received medical attention five minutes after the
injury. Decision reversed. Davis v. Keller, (Jan. 7, 1926) 150 N. E. 70.
In other jurisdictions it has been held that where a person is injured
without fault on the part of the railroad company there is no liability on
the railroad because its employe fails to give aid to the person injured,
Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281; Griswold
v. Boston, & etc., R. R. Co., 182 Mass. 434, 67 N. E. 354; 33 Cyc. 774. It
seems that the Indiana courts have not decided this question hitherto, al-
though in Tippecanoe & etc., Co. v. Cleveland & etc., Co., 57 Ind. App. 644,
106 N. E. 739, attention is directed to this rule in other states. But in the
instant case, the court said, "the duty of the railroad only arises, if at all,
as to a bare licensee or trespasser, out of strict fiecessity and urgent ex-
igency, where immediate attention thereto is demanded in order to save
live or prevent great injury." Thus the court felt that in this case there
was no urgency for the particular employe to aid the appellee since he was
receiving medical attention with great promptitude through notice given
by another employe, Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v'. Early, 141 Ind. 73, 40 N. E. 257.
It seems that Indiana is now added to the jurisdictions that hold that there
is no relational duty of aid owed by a railroad company to an injured licensee
unless there is an actual emergency. It does not seem that the allegation
of attractive nuisance could have been urged seriously. Surely if the entire
right of way of a railroad company is an attractive nuisance there are no
limits to this doctrine. In regard to the obligation to slow down when the
train notices a small child playing on the track, the Indiana rule is in keep-
ing with the general rule that there is a duty to slow down in the case of a
child while in the case of an adult the duty is merely to sound a warning
of the train's approach, "but in the instant case there is no averment that
appellee was either on the track or in a place of danger as the train ap-
proached." R. M. W.
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APPELLATE COURT
12142 ADAMS V. SHAMROCK OIL Co. Grant County. Affirmed. Per curiam.
February 2, 1926.
12212 ASHLEY v. KELLEY, et at. Spencer County. Denied. Nichols, C. J.
February 5, 1926.
Where an adjoining landowner is required to pay his part toward a par-
tition fence under the statute, he may be compelled to do so even though
this fence is not of service to him.
12094 BALTIMORE & OHIO R. R. Co. v. APPLEGATE. Clark County. Denied.
McMahan, J. February 17, 1926.
Petition denied and remittitur ordered.
12327 BRYAN V. REIFE, et al. Lake County. Affirmed. Thompson, J. Feb-
ruary 17, 1926.
Where the judicial sale is not of the husband's real estate, the dower
interest of the wife is not preserved as against bona fide purchasers for
value. The recorded warranty deed of the owner and his wife was a good
defense to any action under the statute, Burns R. S. 1926 Sec. 3052.
12179 BUSH, et al. V. GOBLE, et al. Clinton County. Affirmed. Enloe, P. J.
February 17, 1926.
Where one deposits a note with a bank for collection, the possession of
the note by the bank is prima facie evidence of its ownership of the note.
There must be some positive evidence that the bank was merely acting as
agent in order to overcome this presumption of ownership.
12244 COOK V. DEBus. Starke County. Affirmed. February 24, 1926. Per
Curiam.
12545 DR RAYA V. ILLINOIS STEEL CO. Industrial Board. Affirmed. Thomp-
son, J. February 18, 1926.
The Industrial Board may pass upon the question of whether a widow
was in fact dependent upon the earnings of the deceased and may judge of
the creditability of witnesses.
12348 DOERR v. HIBBEN, HOLLWEG & CO. Marion Probate. Affirmed. Remy,
J. February 26, 1926.
Where one partner makes a contract of guarantee with a merchant to
cover value of goods which the merchant advances with wholesaler to
cover the price of goods which the wholesaler advances to a store; then this
contract of guarantee does not limit the merchant's recovery against the
partner, if the partner was a general partner in this same store and con-
cealed this fact from the merchant at the time of the guarantee.
12527 EUREKA COAL Co. v. POWERS. Industrial Board. Remanded to In-
dustrial Board for further proceedings. Enloe, P. J. February 2,
1926.
Where appellant had received full payment for an injury under the Work-
man's Compensation Act, and where the evidence tended to show that his
later injury was due to a subsequent accident, only then it was an error to
admit a reopening of the original award on the ground that there had
been recurrence of the injury.
12546 EVANSVILLE PURE MILK Co. v. ALLEN. Industrial Board. Affirmed.
McMahan, J. February 10, 1926.
Where there has been medical attention furnished in the meantime,
a claim for added compensation on the ground of a recurrence of the in-
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jury is proper although it is not filed until more than a year after the
original adjustment was made..
12335 FOSTER, et al. V. NORTH SIDE BANK. Vanderburgh County. Affirmed.
Enloe, P. J. February 19, 1926.
Where a bank cashier secured checks for temporary deposit in order to
obscure deficiencies in the bank's statement and then later a note was
given to pay for these advances, this note was enforcible and not void for
duress or illegality.
12305 GAl ER V. KING. Marion County. Affirmed. McMahan, J. February
17, 1926.
Where d contract indicates that the sale of a certain number of shares
of stock covers the total holdings of the vendor in the company, this does
not tend to deceive another officer of the company who is presumed to know
the actual holdings of the vendor. Where one makes a sale of stock inde-
pendently of a pool of men who are arranging a merger of two companies,
this independent transaction of the vendor is not involved in any fiduciary
relationship which the members of the pool may bear to each other.
12525 HILL COAL & COKE Co. v. GREGSON, et al. Industrial Board. Affirmed.
Remy, J. February 4, 1926.
Where decedent's sister was awarded compensation for partial depen-
dency under the Workman's Compensation Act, there is no authority in the
law for terminating this allowance merely on the ground of her subsequent
marriage.
12242 HUNTINGTON GRocERY CO. V. VAN BUSKIRK. Wabash County. Af-
fig-med. Nichols, J. February 24, 1926.
Judgment affirmed on the authority of Kohler v. Grzesk, 17 Ind. App.
702, 133 N. E. 506.
12285 JORDAN V. KITTLE. Marion County. Affirmed. McMahan, J. Feb-
ruary 25, 1926.
A transfer of property in pursuit of a plan for divorce on condition
that only certain allegations shall be made in the divorce proceedings is
void as being an agreement to bring about a divorce.
12187 JoYco v. GRISWOLD. Howard County. Reversed. Nichols, P. J.
February 17, 1926.
Where non-residents are made defendants in an action to have a trust
declared of property in Indiana, the action is against the property and
personal service, such as would be required if the action were against non-
residents personally, is not necessary.
12218 KILMER V. McCoRMICK. Delaware County. Affirmed. Bausman, J.
February 23, 1926.
Where appellant lived with his married sister but was temporarily absent
from the state at the time, there was sufficient service in the case of a suit
on a promissory note to serve appellant at his sister's home.
12559 LANGDON V. HADLEY. Marion County. Affirmed. Bausman, J.
February 26, 1926.
Judgment affirmed on the authority of Pence v. Aughe, 101 Ind. 317.
12069 MILLER, et al. V. MILLER. Rush County. Affirmed. McMahan, J.
February 3, 1926.
Where one allows another to use his money in the purchase of a farm,
and oral testimony shows that this was intended as a gift, then the credit-
ors of the donor have no right to the property for the payment of his debt.
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12340 MONTGOMERY, et al. V. CRUM. Vanderburg County. Reversed. Thomp-
son, J. February 3, 1926.
Where the divorced husband has kept custody of the child in viola-
tion of the court's orders there is no right of action in damages for mental
suffering in the divorced wife.
12524 NORMAN V. HARTMAN FURN. CO. Industrial Board. Affirmed.
Thompson, J. February 4, 1926.
Where a salesman traveling for an Illinois corporation is killed on a
railway in Indiana, there is no jurisdiction for the Industrial Board to make
an award to his widow under the Workman's Compensation Act.
12219 OBERTING V. JUTTU. Marion County. Affirmed. Thompson, J. Feb-
ruary 19, 1926.
Where the decedent deposited money in a savings bank in the joint name
of himself and appellant in order that appellant might draw the money
for the benefit of decedent, it was proper for appellee to bring an action
to recover this money as belonging to decedent's estate.
12158 REITEMEIER v. LINARD, et al. Cass County. Affirmed. Thompson, J.
February 24, 1926.
Where it appears that the instruction did not affect the verdict of the
jury, there is no reversible error even though the instruction is wrong.
12152 RICHARDSON, et at. V. CROUCH, et al. Boone County. Petition Denied.
McMahan, J. February 24, 1926.
There must be a showing of actual fraud if one is to set aside a sale of
land on the ground that the sale was made with the fraudulent intent of both
parties to prevent the creditor from collecting his judgment against the
vendor.
12412 RUBIN, RUBIN V. HODES, MINKO, SCHULMAN. St. Joseph County.
Affirmed. Nichols, C. J. February 17, 1926.
Where there is a contract of agency under which the agent is to have a
certain time to secure a purchaser for land, the agent will be allowed to re-
cover his commission if the owner refuses to consummate the sale within that
time in order to avoid paying the commission.
12429 SECURITY TRUST CO. V. JAQUA. Morgan County. Reversed. Mc-
Mahan, J. February 2, 1926.
Where an executor uses the money of an estate in his private affairs it is
proper to charge him interest on the basis of the fair earning power of the
money so used. Where the judge below died before the decision the bill of ex-
ception and testimony taken only before him was sufficient.
12145 SUMMERS V. BUTLER, et al. Allen County. Affirmed. Per Curiam
February 19, 1926.
12291 TRAVFLERs INSURANCE CO. v. FLETCHER AMER. NAT. BANK OF INDFLS.
& AMER. CENTRAL LiFm INS. CO. Morgan County. Affir-med. Nichols,
J. June 25, 1925. Denied under date of February 19, 1926.
Petition for rehearing denied and opinion modified.
12547 UNITED STATES FURN. CO. V. PITTMEIER, et al. Industrial Board.
Reversed. Remy, J. February 19, 1926.
Reversed on the authority of the Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Haufe, 81
Indiana Appeals 667: 144 N. E. 844.
SUPREME COURT
24803 BRONNENBURG V. STATE. Madison County. Affirmed. Ewbank, C. J.
February 16, 1926.
Where appellant was known to have driven to a certain place and taken
something from his machine and hidden it. He was later seen to have taken
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this same receptacle and replace it in his machine and liquor was found in
this receptacle. It is sufficient evidence for conviction on the ground of
illegally transporting liquor.
24914 BURNETT V. STATE. Marion County. Affitved. Willoughby, J.
February 17, 1926.
Where the evidence shows that two officers saw the defendant transport
liquor in his automobile and this evidence was not contradicted, there
was sufficient evidence to justify a conviction for illegally transporting
intoxicating liquor.
24150 CHAPPELL V. STATE. Marion County. Reversed. Myers, J. Feb-
ruary 18, 1926.
Where the liquor was manufactured by appellant's wife and found in the
rooms of his boarder, there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of
manufacturing liquor although there might be a conviction for possessing
liquor.
24319 DALE v. STATE. Delaware County. Reversed. Travis, J. February
25, 1926.
To publish an article alleging that the officers of the court were in con-
nivance with criminals to wrongfully convict appellant of violation of the
liquor laws is a direct contempt of the court itself.
24869 ARTHUR EISENSHANK V. STATE OF INDIANA. Dearborn County. Re-
versed. Gemmill, J. February 5, 1926.
The prohibition law of 1917 is constitutional. If the court instructs the
jury that it is to judge both the law and facts, the court need not add that
the jury may disregard the court's instructions.
24525 VONNIE FENWICK V. STATE !0 INDIANA. Delaware County. Affirmed.
Myers, J. February 19, 1926.
Appellant by the acceptance of a jury waived irregularities in their
selection if no fraud was alleged.
24946 HASSE V. BIELEFELD. Lake County. Reversed. Myers, J. February
5, 1926.
Where the state board acting under section 152 of the Tax Law of 1919
authorized reassessment of real estate in North Township in Lake County
upon a local basis, this was error since after 1922 the State Board of Tax
Commissioners was required to act wholly as a state wide board.
24992 HICKS v. STATE. Perry County. Reversed. Willoughby, J. Feb-
ruary 23, 1926.
Where appellant was found drunk near a Ford ca' and the registration
card of that automobile was not on the car at the time, there was not
sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of driving an automobile while
intoxicated.
24860 HINES V. STATE. Delaware County. Affirimd. Gemmill, J. Feb-
ruary 2, 1926.
Where appellant had been the housekeeper for a man during a period
of eight years and there was no further evidence submitted, it was proper
for the court to instruct the jury that there was no evidence that appellant
was the common law wife of her employer. This instruction did not tend
to injure the character of appellant in the minds of the jury in an action
in which she was charged with manufacturing liquor illegally.
11786 HITT, et al. v. CARR, et al. Laporte County. Reversed. Bausman, J.
February 19, 1926.
Where there is a written summons showing that appellant had been
served, it was improper to admit another summons which purported to state
that appellant could not be found. Admission of the later summons was
bad since it impeached the record.
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24827 LEJUSTE V. STATE. Delaware County. Reversed. Gemmill, J. Feb-
ruary 25, 1926.
Where a search warrant described the premises as "a one and one-half
story house in East Harris Street in the Town of Eaton, gray in color,"
it was held that this was insufficient where it appeared that there were
other such houses in this block.
24447 LUGAR v. BURNS. Benton County. Affirmed. Ewbank, C. J. Feb-
ruary 24, 1926.
Persons who do not leave a precinct with the intention of changing their
domicile and do not in fact later change their domicile retain their right
to vote in that precinct.
24286 MARSH V. STATE. Vanderburgh County. Reversed. Willoughby,
J. February 16, 1926.
The fact that one is riding with a person who is transporting intoxi-
cating liquors is not sufficient evidence to convict him of illegally trans-
porting liquor.
24794 PALMER V. STATE. Vigo County. Affirmed. Gemmill, J. February
19, 1926.
When women became voters under the 19th amendment all those who
were freeholders or householders became eligible to jury service under the
Indiana law. Where in a criminal case it is not necessary to prove that a
certain concern is a corporation, failure to so prove such an allegation is
immaterial.
25000 P0CKER v. STATE. Harrison County. Affirmed. Ewbank, C. J.
February 3, 1926.
General objections to the admission of testimony without alleged specific
reasons for its exclusion at the time will not make the admission of such
testimony bad. An instruction that the possession of mash was not suf-
ficient to support a conviction for violation of liquor laws was correct.
24743 REYMAN V. STATE. Orange County. Affirmed. Ewbank, C. J. Feb-
ruary 6, 1926.
Where defendant accused of conspiracy has burned a building belonging
to others as well as himself in order to defraud an insurance company, a
conviction is proper although he was not the sole owner. Jurors may not
impeach their own verdict by representation of misconduct.
24537 SHACKLETT V. STATE. Marion County. Affirmed. Myers, J. Feb-
ruary 25, 1926.
It was no entrapment of the appellant where an officer secured liquor
from her by telling her that the officers were gone and that she should
hurry and give him some before they returned.
24475 SLICK V. STATE. Marion County. Affirmed. Willoughby, J. Feb-
ruary 25, 1926.
Where under the old law possession of liquor was not a crime, evidence
that the defendant had made and possessed the liquor would not result
in error if she were acquitted under these facts.
24585 SNEDEGAR V. STATE. Putnam County. Affirmed. Travis, J. Feb-
ruary 5, 1926.
A search warrant issued under the prohibition act is valid if directed
to the one in actual possession of property even though he does not live
there and is not the owner. An error in fixing upon the owner of the
premises is not significant where the premises themselves and the articles
in use there are correctly described.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
24439 SPOHN V. STARK, et al. Elkhart County. Affirmed. Ewbank, J.
February 23, 1926.
Where Appellant leased his property to the state for a period of five years,
it was correct to tax the property as belonging to the Appellant under the
regular tax laws.
24806 STATE ex rel FREELAND, et al. V. BURNS. Decatur County. Reversed.
Ewbank, C. J. February 26, 1926.
Where bonds have been determined upon by a municipality the statute
of 1921 allows fifteen days thereafter within which to file an appeal to the
state board of tax commissioners. The amendment to that provision, Acts
1923, page 264, is not retroactive.
24323 STATE ON RELATION OF TAYLOR V. WHETSEL. Jay County. Petition
for Rehearing Overruled. Ewbank, C. J. February 19, 1926.
It is the duty of the court to search the record in order to uphold a judg-
ment of a lower court. Here the evidence properly showed that the children
lived in the district where the school was.
24427 TOWN OF ST. JOHN V. GERLACH, et al. Lake County. Affirmed.
Ewbank, C. J. February 19, 1926.
Proceedings by appellee to have their land disannexed from the appel-
lant town, such disannexation was proper where the taxes were higher
without any benefit to the land concerned. Such authority in the court
does not make the statute unconstitutional on the ground of its exercising
legislative functions.
25130 TERRE HAUTE, INDPLS. & EASTERN TRAcTION CO. V. SCOTT. Boone
County. Reversed. Ewbank, C. J. February 18, 1926.
Where a passenger sues carrier for damages sustained where robbers
attack the carrier's train, there can be no recovery unless it appeared that
the carrier's servants were negligent in not giving the plaintiff due pro-
tection under the circumstances.
24561 WELCH V. STATE. Martin County. Reversed. Myers, J. February
16, 1926.
Where wife was riding with her husband in an automobile which con-
tained intoxicating liquor and there was no direct evidence that she was
participating in this transportation, it is error to convict her of illegally
transporting liquor.
25020 ZAKRASEK V. STATE. Elkhart County. Affirmed. Travis, J. Feb-
ruary 16, 1926.
Ignorance of the new law that possession of intoxicating liquor alone is
an offense will not prevent the defendant from conviction for violation of
the law.
